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DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

4 May 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/COP/CE

SUBJECT : Proposed Operational Plan for []

1. Background

a. [] is a Lithuanian who came out of the Soviet Union and defected in Berlin on 26 October 1955. He confessed shortly after his arrival in the West that his mission was to penetrate VLIK, a Lithuanian emigre organization, and to approach a member of VLIK with a copy of a recruitment statement that the latter had signed in 1941. After Subject's confession, arrangements were made to have him approach the VLIK member in a re-recruitment pitch as per his original RIS instructions. This meeting was held in a wired room under controlled conditions in an effort to determine how the VLIK member would react to an RIS approach and if he would be hostile or accept [] as a fellow RIS agent. The VLIK member reacted by reporting the incident immediately to the field case officer and though admitting to having signed the recruitment statement, denied that he had ever done any work for the RIS. He claimed he had signed the statement under duress and that it was not uncommon at that time for the Soviets to pressure people into signing such statements. (Other sources tend to verify this claim.)

b. [] was later debriefed and it was decided to double him back for a mission to the Soviet Union. The field case officer's plan for dispatch of the agent was approved in principle by DIR-01906 (OUT 77072).

2. Operational Plan as proposed by the field with headquarters modifications

a. [] cover story for the RIS is to be that he went to VLIK as instructed and was turned over to an AIS case officer for debriefing and interrogation. He then is supposed to have been sent back to VLIK for debriefing and at that time made his approach to the VLIK member he was supposed to contact. He was then ostensibly returned to Frankfurt where he was held by the AIS while they were checking his story. [] is supposed to then become increasingly worried that the VLIK member would confess to AIS that an approach was made to him by an RIS agent.

[] is then to pretend to panic and flee to the DDR.

b. [] is to reestablish contact with us by S/W when he feels himself secure in the acceptance of his story by the Soviets.

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3. Mission

a. His first task would be to report the RIS handling techniques subsequent to his return to their control.

b. Later when he reestablishes himself in Lithuania he is to report operational and positive intelligence information as per requirements.

4. Communications

a. The RIS gave Subject permission to write to his sister who is living in the United States and this would be a desirable natural link of communication with him. The sister would be used to send letters and packages of goods Subject could sell in order to provide him with sufficient operating funds. Subject is particularly worried that we would be sending him back merely as a means of disposal, so it has been necessary to assure him that he will be adequately supplied in order to boost his morale and get better assurance of his future usefulness to us. One of the problems anticipated in attempting to use the sister as a contact is that as a U.S. resident (it is not known if she is a U.S. citizen) it will be necessary to have her cleared through the FBI. The Bureau is not likely to give priority to conduct of an investigation for a case of this sort and it is expected that a clearance would take between 4 and 6 months. This clearance would be necessary before initial contact could be made and by that time it is expected that [] will have been dispatched. It would also be necessary to gain the sister's confidence by giving some plausible reason for our interest. This might be accomplished by simply telling her that we are interested in the patriotic work her brother is doing in Lithuania and therefore want to help him through her. On the other hand, if she is very curious and does not respond favorably to this simple statement, it might be difficult to establish our bona-fides with her and to establish control over her.

b. Due to the above anticipated difficulties with use of the sister as a communication channel, an alternate plan might be to set up a notional person, or one recruited especially for this purpose as mail channel. This person can be explained to the RIS as a cousin of [] that he heard about through his sister. Even if the sister cannot be used directly, some of the mail can nevertheless be addressed from her in order not to arouse suspicion about the number of packages being sent to [] from the notional cousin.

c. It has been suggested to the field that they have Subject prepare the initial contact letter for his sister incorporating the idea that it was written from inside Lithuania but that he gave the letter to

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a notional friend who was traveling to E. Berlin from where the letter will be mailed. In his letter to his sister, [] will explain that he is sending the letter via a friend because he thought that it would arrive sooner. Subject is to tell the RIS that he decided to let his sister think that he is still in Lithuania because he was afraid her curiosity would be aroused about the circumstances of his being in Germany.

5. Training

Subject is currently being trained in an expendable, though high-class S/W system and will also be given a standard training course in tradecraft subjects. It is expected that he will be dispatched in June 1956.

6. Approval

An Amendment to Renewal of Project AECHAMP has been approved by the Chief, FI/OPS for including the [] in the AECHAMP Project.

References:

- a. FROB 3212 (IN 41844)
- b. DIR 01906 (OUT 77072)
- c. Project AECHAMP (Amendment to Renewal) dated 20 March 1956.

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Chief, SR/2

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